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When subjects are asked to perceptually bind rapidly alternating color and motion stimuli,
the pairings they report are different from the ones actually occurring in physical reality. A
possible explanation for this misbinding is that the time necessary for perception is differ-
ent for different visual attributes. Such an explanation is in logical harmony with the fact
that the visual brain is characterized by different, functionally specialized systems, with
different processing times for each; this type of organization naturally leads to different
perceptual times for the corresponding attributes. In the present review, the experimental
findings supporting perceptual asynchrony are presented, together with the original the-
oretical explanation behind the phenomenon and its implication for visual consciousness.
Alternative theoretical views and additional experimental facts concerning perceptual mis-
binding are also reviewed, with a particular emphasis given to the role of attention. With
few exceptions, most theories converge on the idea that the observed misbinding reflects
a difference in perception times, which is in turn due to differences in neuronal processing
times for different attributes within the brain.These processing time differences have been
attributed to several different factors, attention included, with the possibility of co-existence
between them.
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FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION AND PERCEPTUAL
ASYNCHRONY IN VISION
A picture of functional specialization with respect to the processing
of different visual attributes has emerged from studies in the visual
system (Zeki, 1978, 1993). Such a specialization makes sense since,
for example, the perception of color involves very different com-
putations from the ones involved in perceiving motion: motion
perception requires the calculation of the way in which an object
changes position in space over time, whereas the task of a system
generating color would be to compare the energy-wavelength com-
position of the light reflected simultaneously from different objects
in the field of view and thus calculate their reflectances, irrespective
of any changes in the illumination (e.g., Land, 1971). Functional
specialization states that these different tasks are undertaken by
different, functionally specialized systems, occupying topograph-
ically separate locations in the visual brain (Zeki, 1978, 1993).
Specialized brain areas are created in this way, each one charac-
terized by specialized neurons with different connection patterns,
different conduction velocities and so on. Such architecture of the
visual brain begs the question of whether these separate systems
could “finish” their so different tasks at exactly the same time. The
word “finish” is used here to refer to the time necessary for the
corresponding visual percept to emerge – I will refer to this as per-
ception time. Given this distribution of function and the reasons for
it, it seems likely that different visual attributes could have differ-
ent perception times and are therefore not perceived in synchrony.
It should be noted that we are currently unaware of the spatiotem-
poral structure of the neurobiological events underpinning visual
awareness. Thus, perception time is regarded here as a property of
the corresponding processing-perceptual system as a whole, free
from any vague assumptions regarding particular visual areas and
activation patterns in the brain. Since we are still far from under-
standing where or how a conscious visual percept arises in the
brain, the exact relationship of the latter with activity reaching any
certain levels in any particular brain areas (Moutoussis and Zeki,
2002; Moutoussis, 2009), back-projections and feedback (Lamme
and Roelfsema, 2000), oscillations and synchronizations (Singer,
1999), etc., is beyond the interest of the general idea of perceptual
asynchrony in vision.
The question of whether different visual attributes are perceived
at exactly the same or at different times has been addressed exper-
imentally (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a,b): If the perception time
for a particular visual attribute, say color, is dt time shorter than
that necessary for the perception time for another visual attribute,
say motion, then the color which is present on the computer screen
at time t will be perceived synchronously with the motion present
on the screen at time t−dt. If this motion is different to the motion
present on the screen at time t, then the color present on the
screen at time t will not be perceived together with the motion
with which it physically coexisted, but with a different one, which
had occurred at time t−dt. Similarly, if the color changes at time
t+ dt then also the motion present on the screen at time t will be
perceived together with this new color rather than with the color
with which it occurred together in reality. By presenting stim-
uli changing both in color (red/green) and in motion direction
(up/down) rapidly and continuously, and instructing participants
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to report which color-motion pairs were perceived as coexisting,
color was found to be paired with the motion present on the com-
puter screen ∼100 ms earlier (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a). The
observed misbinding between the two visual attributes was taken
to suggest that the color of an object is perceived roughly 100 ms
before its direction of motion. We have called this phenomenon
perceptual asynchrony and have put forward the idea that it is due
to the different processing times necessary for the two functionally
specialized systems to “finish” their corresponding tasks. Binding
color and motion belonging to the same object is not crucial,
since identical results were also obtained when color and motion
were made to belong to different objects (Moutoussis and Zeki,
1997b)1. The perception of form (orientation) falls between that
of color and of motion in time, with the estimated values of the
three perception time differences adding up nicely (Moutoussis
and Zeki, 1997b). The functionally specialized systems in vision
thus seem able to create specific visual percepts in their own time
and independently from each other, inspiring the so-called micro-
consciousness theory, which states that conscious visual perception
is not single and unified but rather made out of several, indepen-
dent consciousnesses of the different visual attributes (Zeki and
Bartels, 1999).
The color-motion misbinding illusion has been verified by sev-
eral studies (Arnold et al., 2001; Viviani and Aymoz, 2001; Arnold
and Clifford, 2002; Nishida and Johnston, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003;
Clifford et al., 2003, 2004; Moradi and Shimojo, 2004; Arnold,
2005; Holcombe and Cavanagh, 2008). Particularly interesting is
a study that controls for response bias, by combining perceptual
asynchrony and the color-contingent motion-after-effect (MAE;
Arnold et al., 2001). Continuous presentation of a rotating stim-
ulus for a period of time will make a subsequent static stimulus
appear to rotate in the opposite direction (Mather et al., 2008).
This after-effect can be made contingent on color, by associating a
particular direction of motion to a particular color and the oppo-
site direction to a second color, during the same adaptation period
(Favreau et al., 1972). Thus, if during adaptation red is associated
with rightward motion and green with leftward motion, a static red
pattern will appear to rotate leftwards and a static green pattern to
rotate rightwards. In this way, the characteristics of the after-effect
will directly reflect the perceptual associations between color and
motion during the adaptation period. Arnold et al. have used our
psychophysical paradigm to adapt subjects to rotational motion,
and then checked for a color-contingent MAE. If the perception
of color and motion were veridical, the maximum MAE in their
experiment would have been obtained when the color and motion
oscillations are in phase, with no MAE when the two oscillations
are 90˚ out of phase (both color-motion pairs equally present).
However, results from this experiment were in accord with the
existence of a perceptual lag between motion and color percep-
tion, as originally reported by Moutoussis and Zeki (1997a,b).
Since there was no binding-task involved, this novel setup has the
1It should be noted here that perceptual asynchrony occurs only when continu-
ous changes are apparent as happening within clearly separate objects: perceptual
misbinding was not produced by manipulations making the stimuli appear as (con-
tinuously present) transparent objects (Clifford et al., 2004; Moradi and Shimojo,
2004)
advantage of being protected against any possible response bias
of the participants2. In an attempt to account for the observed
MAE without accepting the existence of perceptual asynchrony,
Johnston and Nishida (2001) have suggested a hypothetical and
somewhat far fetched mechanism, by which a change in the firing
rate of neurons during the initial and the final stage of the color
stimulus results to asymmetrical adaptation. Even if such a hypo-
thetical mechanism exists, it is still not so clear why the binding
should be stronger during the first part of the appearance of the
new color rather than that of the new motion.
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS ON THE MISBINDING EFFECT
As noted above, since we do not yet know where, when and how in
the brain a visual percept is created, the time taken from the pre-
sentation of a stimulus to its conscious perception is unknown.
The psychophysical paradigm of Moutoussis and Zeki (1997a,b)
can potentially measure perception time differences between differ-
ent visual attributes, since perception times per se cannot be directly
measured. What can be directly measured, however, is the reaction
time to a visual stimulus. Different studies have used different
methods to compare reaction times to color and motion stim-
uli, giving varying results: one study reports a quicker response
to color than to motion (Barbur et al., 1998), whereas no dif-
ference was found in another (Nishida and Johnston, 2002). On
top of that, there is the problem of whether one should expect
reaction time data to reflect any underlying differences in per-
ception time. It is not necessarily correct to use reaction time
data to isolate the perceptual component of the delay, since these
data are confounded with both the preparation and the execution
of a motor response. For example, one could equate the sec-
ond part of a theoretical stimulation-perception-decision-reaction
model between color and motion reaction time data, in order to
draw inferences regarding the first part. But it is far from clear
whether different, functionally specialized, systems share com-
mon decision mechanisms or access the motor system in the
same way and thus equating the perception-decision-reaction part
is questionable. It is also possible that stimulation-reaction short-
cuts might sometimes bypass the stage of conscious perception
for a quicker response to, say, stimuli which are in motion. Thus,
although the time necessary for conscious perception is usually
part of the reaction time to a stimulus, a straightforward inference
from the latter to the former is not always possible (see Arnold,
2010 for similar arguments). The suggestion that motor responses
could be based on the first incoming spikes, whereas perception
integrates over a longer time period (Eagleman, 2010) could be
a possible explanation for the discrepancy observed between the
timing of perception and action. Nevertheless, and despite the fact
that negative results (i.e., not finding a difference) are of secondary
importance in general, the failure of Nishida and Johnston (2002)
to find any differences in the response times to specific colors and
motion directions, remains an open question for the perceptual
asynchrony theory.
2In their original study, Moutoussis and Zeki (1997a) have used confidence ratings
to protect their findings against any possible response bias explanation: participants
were found to be most confident of their pairing response when color and motion
were physically out of phase.
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In addition to reaction time studies, the results on tempo-
ral order judgments (TOJ) between color and motion changes
also vary3: some have found TOJs to be accurate (Nishida and
Johnston, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003), whereas others have reported
that color changes seem to precede synchronous motion onsets
(Viviani and Aymoz, 2001; Aymoz and Viviani, 2004) or direc-
tion reversals (Adams and Mamassian, 2004). In general, the exact
task performed by the subjects seems to be crucial: it has been
shown that, using the exact same stimuli, TOJ tasks can yield no
asynchrony when perceptual pairing judgments tasks do (Bedell
et al., 2003; Clifford et al., 2003). Another issue is that of the rate
of alternation: when participants were asked to judge which fea-
ture (color or motion) changed first, and the peak relative timing
for synchronous judgment (TOJ choices equally split at 50% for
each attribute) was taken as an indication of the perception time
difference, the observed color-motion misbinding was diminished
at slow alternations rates (Nishida and Johnston, 2002). But this
result is perhaps not so surprising, since the nature of the task
in the original experiment requires a moderately high alternation
rate (1–2 Hz) for perceptual asynchrony to be revealed: only then
does the perception time difference shift the temporal relation of
the two percepts a significant proportion of the oscillation period,
leading to a noticeable change in pairing. The phenomenon is thus
diluted for very slow oscillations, but for moderate rates percep-
tion time difference is found to be independent from the rate of the
oscillations (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a; Bedell et al., 2003; Hol-
combe and Cavanagh, 2008). If, on the other hand, the frequency
of the oscillations is too high, perceptual pairing is an impossible
task. This is the reason why, in a study using rapid alternation
rates (between 3.6 and 5.3 Hz), delaying color changes was found
to have no effect in color-motion pairing facilitation (Moradi and
Shimojo, 2004). But if the rates used are within the range that
makes the pairing task possible, delaying color with respect to
motion facilitates perceptual pairing (Arnold, 2005).
In our original experiments (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a,b),
both the color and the motion percept alternated between two val-
ues. Nevertheless, one could argue that, with respect to position,
the motion change is “second-order” (a change in the way position
changes over time – i.e., a change of a change) whereas the color
change is “first-order” (just changing from one color to the other).
It has been suggested that the observed misbinding is because the
brain is slower in calculating a “second-order” change than it is in
calculating a “first-order” change (Nishida and Johnston, 2002).
Technically, two monitor-frames are necessary for a color change
to take place, whereas a motion change needs three. This gives a
∼14 ms time advantage to color, which is far less than the∼100 ms
value observed experimentally. Furthermore, if memory is taken
into account, the single next frame is enough to register a change
for both color and motion. There is thus no big advantage for color
in terms of the nature of the physical presentation, but perhaps
brain mechanisms are internally biased (less sensitive?) against
detecting a “second-order” change. Even so, it should be pointed
3Rather than having to perceptually pair the perception of a particular color to that
of a particular direction of motion, subjects in a TOJ task have to report whether
a (usually) single change in color preceded a (usually) single change in motion or
vice versa.
out here that motion changes are “second-order” with respect to
position, not to motion (we have a first-order change in direc-
tional motion). It is questionable whether motion perception can
be reduced to nothing more than perceiving position changes over
time. There are instances when motion can be perceived without
perceiving any particular object changing position, as in random
dot stimuli (Newsome et al., 1989), or even without any object
changing position at all, as in the MAE (Mather et al., 2008) or
the Leviant illusion (Zeki et al., 1993). Stimulating area V5 can
induce the perception of motion, again without any particular
object being observed to change position (Salzman et al., 1990).
Such studies suggest that motion perception is an autonomous
perceptual entity, rather than the first derivative of position with
respect to time (for a review see Nakayama, 1985). In a series of
experiments manipulating the stimuli so as to make the position
change a first-order change (here/there) and the color to gradually
vary from red to green in a sine-wave manner, the sign of the per-
ceptual misbinding was reversed (Nishida and Johnston, 2002).
Although such a result at first seems to support the first vs. second-
order hypothesis, the nature of this experiment is quite different
from the original one: instead of reporting the perceptual pairing
between two color and two motion percepts, numerous colors and
no motion percept at all were involved, and participants had to pair
the position of an object to the direction of change of its color. In our
experiments, on the other hand, as far as motion perception is con-
cerned, there is a bimodal perceptual switch between two different
percepts, exactly as is the case with color. It should also be noted
that, in the Nishida and Johnston study, when comparing color and
position changes of the same order (either first or second), posi-
tions were found to be paired with colors which were presented at
a slightly later time (Nishida and Johnston, 2002). This, together
with reports of incorrect pairing between first-order (color and
orientation) changes (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997b; Clifford et al.,
2003), as well as between second-order changes (Arnold and Clif-
ford, 2002 – see next section) dilutes significantly the strength of
the order-of-change account for perceptual misbinding.
It could be that the perception of the time at which a percept
was perceived (when was that?) could be different from the real
time at which perception of the percept took place (what is that?) If
so, a misbinding could emerge as a result of the meta-analysis of
salient temporal features, by a neural mechanism dedicated to code
the timing of events, suggesting that the subjective time course of
visual experience is the product of analysis beyond the tempo-
ral processing of the content of the events themselves (Dennett
and Kinsbourne, 1992; Nishida and Johnston, 2002). It is not so
clear whether the idea of perceptual asynchrony is totally aban-
doned in such a theory, i.e., whether color and motion take the
same time to be perceived or not. The theory rather concentrates
on the hypothetical existence of an independent system in the
brain, responsible for the perception of the time of events, which
is different from the mechanisms responsible for the perception
of the events themselves. In such a scenario, the psychophysically
observed misbinding (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a,b) is no longer
considered to be the result of perceptual mechanisms per se, but
an inaccurate judgment of the time of occurrence of perceptual
events. It reflects the properties of a third mechanism, which uses
temporal markers to reference the time a specific event occurs in
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the world, rather than the time that the processing of the event is
completed in the brain (Nishida and Johnston, 2002). An error-
prone process of matching temporal markers of a different order
(see above) could perhaps provide an alternative explanation to
the perceptual misbinding observed. However, in addition to the
ill-defined nature of temporal markers (see Arnold, 2010), one
has to assume that, somewhere in the brain, a mechanism exists
which is responsible and capable for timing perceptual events and
providing the temporal order between them. Given functional spe-
cialization and no evidence for a terminal point of convergence in
the brain (Shipp and Zeki, 1995), it would be a challenging task
for this mechanism to have synchronous access to the output of
several specialized processing-systems, in order to synchronize the
perceived time of occurrence of percepts different in nature, and
give an accurate picture of events in the real world.
Temporal markers are supposed to reference the time a spe-
cific event occurs in the world rather than the time the processing
of this event completes in the brain. However, the idea of the
perception of the time of a percept being different to the time
that the actual percept is being perceived, seems quite awkward.
It suggests a dissociation between the subjective time course of
events, as it appears to the observer, and the times at which
representations of those events are established in the observer’s
brain. Even more awkward seems the idea of the brain being
able to know about the timing of things happening elsewhere
(i.e., in the outside world), something necessary for a mech-
anism to be able to correctly synchronize different perceptual
events in order to reflect physical reality. It is already difficult
enough to imagine how such a mechanism could know the exact
timing of different events within the brain. Even if such a mech-
anism exists, its function seems more appropriate for TOJ tasks,
reporting the temporal order of events. But TOJ and perceptual
pairing are two very different tasks, not least because in the for-
mer participants need to make a decision after the presentation
of the stimuli, based on the memory of single, transient percep-
tual events (see Viviani and Aymoz, 2001 or Gauch and Kerzel,
2008 for examples). On the contrary, in perceptual-binding, deci-
sions are not based on memory, since the stimulus is continu-
ously present on the screen and the subject has to decide online
which color is being perceived together with which direction of
motion. It has been suggested that “postdiction4” mechanisms
could be involved in TOJs of single events, as for example in exper-
iments investigating the flash-lag effect (Eagleman and Sejnowski,
2000). Therefore, using TOJ with respect to the instances at which
color and motion changes occur, could potentially give mislead-
ing results with respect to the perception time of a particular
visual attribute (see also the section on attention below). Finally,
the independence of the apparent asynchronies on the oscilla-
tion rate (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a; Bedell et al., 2003) is
problematic for a marker-mismatch account of the phenomenon
(see Arnold, 2010 for a detailed argument), and it is far from
clear why there should be a tendency to pair markers attached to
first-order position transitions with markers attached to delayed
4This term is given to the idea that perception, rather than being online, accumu-
lates evidence over small time intervals before committing to a given perceptual
experience.
(rather than earlier) color changes. In conclusion, the temporal
marker theory remains, at least to me, highly speculative as well as
problematic5.
Based on a possible “postdiction” character of visual percep-
tion in general, yet another alternative explanation of perceptual
misbinding has been suggested (Moradi and Shimojo, 2004). The
basic idea is that a postdictive analysis determines the percep-
tual properties of new surfaces, by waiting for ∼80 ms in order
to integrate perceptual events taking place during this period and
then allocating the result of this integration to its beginning. This
time period is initiated by some sort of transient, like a direc-
tion reversal, which erases all previous information accumulated.
The timing allocated by the brain to the result of perceptual inte-
gration is thus the commencement rather than the end of the
integration period, something that could hypothetically compen-
sate for the variability of neural transmissions (see Dennett and
Kinsbourne, 1992). In this way, information from after an event
is taken into account before committing to a visual interpretation
(Eagleman and Sejnowski, 2000; Moradi and Shimojo, 2004). In
an experiment using random dot stimuli with red and green dots,
a particular group of dots suddenly turned gray and was set into
motion, at the end of which these dots either returned to their
original color or reversed color, and participants were found to
report the color of the moving dots to be that after the motion
was over (Moradi and Shimojo, 2004). This result was taken as
an indication that the brain integrates perceptual events over a
period of time, pairing together motion with a color that occurs at
a later time, in a “postdiction” manner6. In the scenario in which
a postdictive account of visual perception is combined together
with the assumption that color is not treated evenly during the
integration period (last part given more weight), perceptual asyn-
chrony could perhaps find an alternative explanation (Moradi and
Shimojo, 2004). However, an easy way to distinguish between this
and the original brain-time explanation, is the fact that they pre-
dict different optimal conditions for making temporal judgments
(see Arnold, 2005): postdiction gives a satisfactory explanation for
the results observed at a phase difference of 90˚, but cannot explain
the results observed when the color and motion oscillations are in
complete synchrony (i.e., at a phase difference of 0˚). More specif-
ically, if the appearance of a new direction of motion “resets” the
system and makes the pairing between motion and color stronger
during the later stage of this motion, then this could potentially
explain why this motion is not equally paired with the two colors
but more strongly with the second one at a phase difference of
90˚. The same explanation would also predict, however, a perfect
binding between motion and its corresponding color at a phase
difference of 0˚, something which is contrary to what has been
observed (see text footnote 2). Perceptual asynchrony, on the other
hand, not only explains equally well the result at a phase differ-
ence of 90˚, but also predicts the misbinding observed at a phase
difference of 0˚. In a series of experiments in which the opposite
direction of motion was replaced by a different transient (total
5For a recent defense of this theory, see Nishida and Johnston (2010)
6Note that these results can be equally well explained by perceptual asynchrony, a
quicker perception time making color to be perceived together with motion that
took place earlier in real time.
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absence of the moving stimulus), color-motion misbinding was
minimized and motion–motion misbinding was induced (Arnold,
2005). As proposed previously (Arnold and Clifford, 2002), the
absence of the opponent direction of motion seems to result in
faster processing within the motion system, reducing its lag with
respect to the color system and introducing a perceptual advan-
tage compared to a situation in which the opponent direction is
present. Postdiction, on the other hand, would predict that any
change in the motion status resets the system, irrespective of the
particular characteristics of this transient.
THE EFFECTS OF PROCESSING TIME MANIPULATIONS
If perceptual asynchrony is due to a difference between the pro-
cessing times of different functionally specialized systems, changes
in the speed of processing should lead to changes in the magni-
tude of asynchrony. Along this line of thought, the role of the well
known physiological effect of motion opponency has been exam-
ined (Arnold and Clifford, 2002). In our original setup, the two
motion directions used (up and down) activate neuronal popu-
lations which inhibit each other maximally (Barlow and Levick,
1965; Snowden et al., 1991), possibly leading to a significant delay
in processing time within the motion system. Indeed, Arnold and
Clifford (2002) have found that the magnitude of the perception
time difference between color and motion varies with respect to
the angular difference between the two directions of motion which
are present in the stimulus. The maximum difference was observed
when the two directions were opposite, i.e., when the inhibition
between the two neuronal populations responsible for the pro-
cessing of the motion signal was at its maximum. However, while
reduced, a robust perceptual asynchrony was still evident in the
presence of a relatively slight angular difference in motion direc-
tion, suggesting that direction-selective inhibition is not the sole
cause of perceptual asynchrony. These results pose a problem for
the Nishida and Johnston (2002) temporal marker account, since
it is not clear why the position of a temporal marker signaling
a given direction of motion should depend on the magnitude of
the preceding direction change. Furthermore, the fact that it takes
different amounts of time to perceive two different motion pairs,
which are nevertheless both second-order changes (Arnold and
Clifford, 2002), speaks against the first- vs. second-order explana-
tion of asynchrony (Nishida and Johnston, 2002). This finding also
suggests that visual experience does not require the mediation of
interpretive processes (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992; Eagleman
and Sejnowski, 2000) or the aim of any specialized temporal cod-
ing system (Nishida and Johnston, 2002). Similar results, showing
a dependence of perception time differences on the relative direc-
tions of motion, have been also found using random dot stimuli
(Bedell et al., 2003 – but see Amano et al., 2007 for objections and
an alternative view on the directional-effect).
There is further evidence for a direct relationship between the
time courses of sensory processing in the brain and the tim-
ing of perceptual events, coming from experiments that show a
dependence of the magnitude of perceptual asynchrony on factors
such as the salience of the stimuli (Adams and Mamassian, 2004),
their luminance (Bedell et al., 2006), as well as their contrast and
speed (Lankheet and van de Grind, 2010). Clifford et al. (2004)
have manipulated depth, speed, and transparency to show that
the phenomenology of binding parallels the physiological prop-
erties of area V5 (as is the case with direction-specific inhibition)
and is thus a direct reflection of the time course of the underly-
ing neural processing. It therefore seems that the magnitude of
perceptual asynchrony varies in a manner that is broadly consis-
tent with the known dynamics of sensory processing (see Arnold,
2010 for similar arguments). Within this neurobiological frame,
a model explaining perceptual asynchrony with respect to feed-
back connections to V1 has been also proposed (Clifford, 2010),
since the latter seems to be involved in both perceptual-binding
(Hochstein and Ahissar, 2002; Shipp et al., 2009) and visual
consciousness (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000; Pascual-Leone and
Walsh, 2001).
THE POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT OF ATTENTION
Attention is joined at the hip with visual perception and con-
sciousness, the link being so strong that it is sometimes difficult
to distinguish between them (see Lamme, 2004). Several lines of
evidence suggest that attention could be involved in the integra-
tion of visual information (Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Reynolds
and Desimone, 1999). More specifically, it has been suggested that
attention plays a crucial role in feature pairing, by associating
features at a particular spatial location (Treisman and Gelade,
1980) and constructing neurons with dual selectivity to color
and motion, as revealed by both anatomical (Shipp et al., 2009)
and neurophysiological (Croner and Albright, 1999) findings. Psy-
chophysically, rapid alternations of color and motion (above 5 Hz)
prevent their correct pairing, despite the fact that both are still indi-
vidually identifiable (Moradi and Shimojo, 2004; Arnold, 2005).
Such a low temporal resolution nicely fits with the idea that feature
binding might be under the control of a slow, high-level process
like attention (Duncan et al., 1994).
Given the above, it is possible that perceptual asynchrony could
be influenced by attention, or even totally explained in terms of
attentional mechanisms. If this is the case, manipulating attention
should modulate the magnitude, and perhaps the sign, of per-
ceptual asynchrony. Experiments show that, although attended
changes appear to precede unattended ones in temporal judg-
ments (Sternberg and Knoll, 1973; Reeves and Sperling, 1986), the
effects of endogenous feature attention on perceptual asynchrony
(as measured via errors in perceptual pairing) are not robust. In
a study in which subjects were instructed to attend to a particular
color and pair it with one of two possible orientations in half of
the trials, while in the other half of the trials attend to a particular
orientation and pair it with one of two possible colors (Clifford
et al., 2003), the perception time advantage of color over orienta-
tion was decreased in 2/3 subjects when attending to orientation
(compared to when attending to color). Such a result suggests that
attention might be able to modulate the magnitude of perceptual
asynchrony, perhaps by speeding up the processing of the attended
attribute (Sternberg and Knoll, 1973; Posner et al., 1980; Stelmach
and Herdman, 1991; Carrasco and McElree, 2001). Unfortunately,
the small sample used in this study does not allow for any strong
conclusions to be drawn. In a similar study, in which half the
subjects were instructed to attend to color and the other half to
motion, no difference in perceptual pairing was found between the
two conditions (Arnold, 2005). However, using exactly the same
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methodology, an attentional effect has been reported in a meet-
ing abstract some years ago (Enns and Oriet, 2004): asynchrony
was found to reverse when subjects in one group were instructed
to attend to color and then report the corresponding motion,
compared to when subjects in a different group were instructed to
attend to motion and report the corresponding color7. A weakness
of this study is that only four phase differences between the color
and the motion oscillations were used: 100% correlation (i.e., 0˚
and 180˚ phase differences) and 50% correlation (90˚ and 270˚
phase differences). The latter are quite difficult conditions (since
color switches in the middle of the motion and vice versa) and a
possible strategy to report the last segment of the non-attended
stimulus could lead to the result reported. In a similar, recent study,
in which many more phase differences were used and participants
had to pair the color and the motion of peripherally presented ran-
dom dot fields, attending to color vs. attending to motion did not
alter perceptual misbinding in any significant way (Holcombe and
Cavanagh,2008). It therefore seems that,despite a few weak reports
for the contrary, voluntary switching between feature dimensions
cannot account for the better part of perceptual asynchrony.
Despite the fact that the effects of voluntary, endogenous atten-
tion are negligible, the possibility that involuntary, exogenous
attention could play a role still remains. A straightforward way
to modulate the ability of a stimulus to draw attention is to
increase its saliency. Using a TOJ task, Adams and Mamassian
(2004) showed that stimulus salience can indeed influence per-
ceptual asynchrony magnitude, with more salient changes being
perceived faster. In this study, saliency was measured in terms
of performance in a previous change-detection task. Interestingly
though, when the contrasted stimulus-changes were matched in
terms of detection ease, color changes were still perceived as occur-
ring before physically synchronous changes in direction. Thus,
although exogenous attention seems able to modulate the magni-
tude of perceptual asynchrony, it cannot provide an adequate and
complete explanation for it (Adams and Mamassian, 2004).
In a different study, strong external transients (known to be
very effective in engaging attention – see Posner, 1980) were used,
in order to modulate exogenous spatiotemporal attention (Hol-
combe and Cavanagh, 2008). It seems odd why spatial attention
alone would give an advantage to any particular feature of the ones
present in the particular spatial location, especially since it has
been previously reported to be ineffective in changing perceptual
asynchrony (Paul and Schyns, 2003). The temporal component
seems to be more important here: perhaps a strong transient signal
sent down both the color and motion pathways could somehow
serve as a cue for synchronization, eliminating the asynchrony
observed otherwise (Holcombe and Cavanagh, 2008). Generaliz-
ing this finding to the perceptual asynchrony reported by others
(e.g., Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a,b), Holcombe and Cavanagh
argue that the latter could be due to unbalanced effects of intrinsic
transients in the stimuli. Although they do not make absolutely
clear what they mean by this, my personal understanding is that
7It should be noted here that this abstract was never followed up by a proper journal
article. In a recent publication by Enns et al. (2010), it is actually acknowledged
that perceptual asynchrony is not simply the result of a “sluggishness” in attentional
shifts from one attribute to the other.
color changes could perhaps be more salient than motion ones,
attracting attention first and thus leading to a more rapid pro-
cessing of this attribute. Alternatively, they could simply mean
that color changes are being processed more quickly than motion
changes. Both of these explanation are not that far from the idea
that, for one reason or the other, color is being processed faster
than motion (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997a,b). It is also not clear
whether these authors discard functional specialization as the rea-
son behind any differences in processing time of the two attributes,
and their main point that attention operates on independent pro-
cessing streams does not seem to be at odds with the functional
specialization argument.
A distinction between the perception of the transients and the
perception of the attributes themselves should be made here: in
variations of our original experiment, in which subjects were
asked to judge whether a color or a motion direction change
occurred first, no perceptual asynchrony was observed (Nishida
and Johnston, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003). The same is true for color
and orientation changes: despite color showing a perception time
advantage in the perceptual pairing task, no time difference was
found between the perception of color changes and that of the
orientation changes (Clifford et al., 2003). If anything, such find-
ings suggest that both transients are made available to perception
equally fast, and it is the actual calculation of what follows the
change which takes longer in the case of motion. Also, if perceptual
asynchrony results because of attention giving a start-advantage
to color, do these authors implicitly suppose that the process-
ing of color and motion take equal time? Given the difference
between both the nature of these attributes and the properties,
topographical distribution and organization of the brain mech-
anisms responsible for their processing, it is rather unlikely. A
compromise would be to assume that there is a perception time
difference due to different processing times, on top of which a
modulatory role of (exogenous) attention is possible.
In addition to the theoretical issues discussed above, there are
also some methodological ones in the Holcombe and Cavanagh
(2008) study. In their experimental setup, random dot fields were
arranged in a circular array around fixation. In each field the
dots were oscillating between red and green, and between moving
toward and away the fixation point, at various phase differences.
While maintaining fixation, the attention of the subjects was
automatically captured by the appearance of a luminance ring
surrounding one of the fields. The task was to report the color
and direction of motion of the dots inside this field, during the
presence of the ring. What was found is that asynchrony was lost,
and that report probability was independent for each feature and
determined by how synchronized this feature was with the cue-
ing ring. The authors concluded that the exogenous transient is
much stronger than both the color and the motion transients
and is thus the determining factor of what will be perceived and
when. However, the cueing ring was presented very briefly (for
half a period) and participants reported on the color and motion
present during this short interval. Given the simultaneous pres-
ence of several stimuli, each one could be individually perceived
only via (voluntary or involuntary) attentional selection. Stim-
uli were thus virtually presented only for a brief interval, during
which a maximum of one change for each attribute took place – in
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most cases one of the colors or motion directions did not appear
at all, leaving one of the attributes without a transient. In order
to misbind something that is presented now to something that
was presented earlier, you need something that was presented ear-
lier! It is therefore not surprising that no misbinding is observed
in cases where there are not enough stimuli present for misbind-
ing to occur. It is possible that subjects perceived (not equally
fast) the two attributes which were mostly available during this
brief period, and reported them from memory (see below) when
asked afterward, without any involvement of perceptual-binding
whatsoever.
Another objection is that the task was not an online perceptual
pairing between color and motion, but a recall from memory of
the presence of color and of motion during this very brief period8.
Experiments reporting perceptual asynchrony give participants
ample of time to observe the continuously alternating stimuli,
and are asked to report on the perceptual co-existence of color
and motion at the time they are experiencing it, since reporting
after the completion of a perceptual event is vulnerable to post-
perceptual biases. It is very difficult to perceptually pair attributes
at single brief presentations, and there is only one such reported
case (Linares and López-Moliner, 2006) but with presentations
which are still quite longer than the ones used by Holcombe and
Cavanagh. What can be accurately reported in such brief presen-
tations is the order of the single changes in motion direction and
color (Nishida and Johnston, 2002; Bedell et al., 2003), a task which
is very different since TOJs on attribute-changes can be accurate
even when continuous presentations lead to false perceptual pair-
ings (Bedell et al., 2003; Clifford et al., 2003). Not surprisingly,
when participants in the Holcombe and Cavanagh (2008) study
were allowed to attend to the stimulus throughout the whole pre-
sentation, a perceptual asynchrony between color and motion was
reported. In another variation of their experiment, asynchrony
was also eliminated when the flash was continuously presented
but stepping from one dot field to the other. However, the part of
the oscillation “illuminated” each time by the flash was always the
same, and was also presented at different spatial locations, mak-
ing this setup perceptually equivalent to (several repetitions of)
the single-flash condition9. These methodological issues, together
with the fact that the main finding of Holcombe and Cavanagh
(2008) is based on a negative result, from only 3 subjects that did
not show much consistency between them (see Figure A1 in their
manuscript), unfortunately weaken the conclusive strength of the
potentially interesting effects reported.
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES REGARDING PERCEPTUAL
ASYNCHRONY
The theoretical context in which these psychophysical results are
put is based on two, perhaps simplified, assumptions. Firstly, that
8Note that, since there was enough presentation time for a single color-motion
“pair” only, participants chose between four possible response buttons (rather than
between two, as in most previous perceptual pairing experiments).
9The authors claim that an apparent asynchrony was also observed when color and
motion sequences were presented only during a ring flash period (but without the
ring). This would be an important finding but, unfortunately, no data is presented
to support it.
there is a given (objective) time10 at which the processing of visual
information leads to the creation of a conscious visual percept.
Secondly, the time at which a subject is having a perceptual expe-
rience, is also the time that the experience is perceived to happen,
i.e., each time I have a percept, I also perceive that it is happening
now. Both these assumptions have been questioned (Dennett and
Kinsbourne, 1992; Johnston and Nishida, 2001), but the alterna-
tive “solutions” offered are even more vague and unsatisfactory
than the problems they are trying to solve11. Given these two
assumptions, the fact that we perceive different visual attributes
at different times, raises some interesting theoretical implications
regarding visual consciousness and consciousness in general. Since
the experiments were initially conceived as a consequence of func-
tional specialization in the visual brain it was natural, given the
results, to suppose that perceptual asynchrony reflects a difference
in processing time between the different, functionally specialized,
systems. Furthermore, the fact that these different visual attrib-
utes are perceived independently and in their own times, supports
the possibility for these systems to be not only processing but also
perceptual ones. Functional specialization is in this way extended
to the world of phenomenology and qualia, giving rise to the idea
of multiple visual consciousnesses coexisting in vision (see Zeki
and Bartels, 1999 for a theoretical expansion of this idea). How-
ever, the introspective unity of consciousness begs the question
of how do these visual percepts, which arise at topographically
different parts of the brain, come together as a single experience.
The problem goes beyond vision, as it also applies to the way
in which different sensory modalities, as well as mental events
in general, are combined into a single, unified consciousness. An
obvious solution would be to assume the existence of some “exec-
utive” brain area to which all other areas report, a central stage at
the end of a hierarchical chain of “importance.” Such a solution
arises from the old intuitive assumption of a “spirit,”“ghost in the
machine,” “single-self,” etc., existing above and supervising over
the rest of the brain, spending its time by comfortably inspecting
mental events projected for its delight on the stage of a “Cartesian
Theater.” Against such an intuition, a series of interesting philo-
sophical arguments fighting this essentially dualistic approach, as
well as fighting against the illusion of the existence of a single“self,”
have been made by Dennett (1991) and Dennett and Kinsbourne
(1992). Additionally, the neuroanatomical reality does not support
the presence of such a “brain within the brain,” where all the paral-
lel distributed processing eventually comes together. There are, of
course, examples of convergence and cross-talking in the brain, an
example related to this discussion being the existence of cortical
and subcortical regions that receive multisensory input. What is
missing is an area where everything comes together – both func-
tion and thus information seem to be dispersed throughout the
brain12. Thus there seems to be no terminal station in the brain,
10This time is probably not dimensionless – it should be considered as a range rather
than as a time-point.
11The basic idea is that perhaps ‘the representation of sequence in the stream of
consciousness is the product of the brain’s interpretive processes, not a direct reflec-
tion of the sequence of events making up these processes’ (Dennett and Kinsbourne,
1992).
12Even if such an area existed, an interesting philosophical game is the idea that,
if different parts of it carried different bits of information, there would have to be
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the architecture of which is characterized by a segregated organiza-
tion principle, containing several functionally specialized modules
that remain more or less separate (Zeki, 1974, 1978; Fodor, 1983).
The perceptual asynchrony results support such a view and extend
it to the specific domain of visual consciousness.
The question, however, remains: in order to perform the task,
subjects need to combine together their color and motion percepts.
Doesn’t this mean that the corresponding two pieces of neuronal
information need to also physically come together at a common
brain area? If not, does this imply that we are looking for a solution
outside the neural substrate (see Johnston and Nishida, 2001)? One
the one hand, the way in which localized activation contributes
to and affects the prevailing brain state and thus consciousness,
remains unknown. On the other hand, the prevailing brain state
is nothing more than the collection of these activations, what is
happening now at various parts of my brain. We have previously
proposes a bold, perhaps extreme solution (Moutoussis and Zeki,
2004), suggesting that there is no binding at all in consciousness
but rather that different experiences are phenomenally “bound”
together in virtue of an external factor, namely the time at which
they occur. In this way, brain-time is still important for the when
of a percept, without the necessity of a single brain structure that
is critical is critical for perceptual-binding. It is perhaps an illu-
sion that I am the same person perceiving both color and motion,
and it is perhaps even more wrong to make a distinction between
the “person” and the “percept.” If we instead assume that a “per-
son” is nothing but a temporary composition of different mental
events coexisting at a given point in time, would the problem be
solved? One would still have to explain the way mental events are
grouped and experienced together – why isn’t the color I perceive
now bound to the motion that you perceive now? It probably has
something to do with the fact that some groups of mental events
(my mental events) are sharing a common brain (my brain), but as
long as the relationship between the latter and the so-called“mind”
remains a mystery, questions like this will also remain unresolved.
However, it is important to point out that these problems do not
yet another round of convergence, everything coming together to an even smaller
part of this area and so on. When is one satisfied that all has come together? Is a
new grandmother-cell type solution, where all information available in the brain
would converge to a single “hyperneuron,” what we really want here? Therefore,
it seems that a convergence-type solution to the binding problem creates noth-
ing more than vicious cycles, and should perhaps be abandoned as a theoretical
approach altogether.
arise because of assuming the presence of functional segregation in
visual consciousness. Alternative views, suggesting that everything
is done everywhere (Schiller, 1997), or that special areas supervise
mental events and assign temporal markers to them (Nishida and
Johnston, 2002), are equally subject to the problem of implemen-
tation with respect to this marvelous physical entity living inside
our head.
CONCLUSION
There seems to be good evidence for a relationship between the
time courses of sensory processing in the brain and the perceived
timing of perceptual events. Most accounts of the perceptual mis-
binding between color and motion accept this idea, the difference
between them being the question of what it is that causes these
processing time differences to occur. Even the temporal marker-
matching theory, which began as a totally different approach,
accepts in its latest, modified version (Amano et al., 2007) the
existence of processing time differences at the heart of the phe-
nomenon, and thus transforms the temporal marker account of
perceptual asynchrony into yet another form of “brain-time” (see
Arnold, 2010). With respect to attention in specific, no strong
conclusion regarding its significance in the misbinding observed
between different visual attributes can be drawn. Most studies have
found weak (if any) effects, and the ones showing an effect are
confounded by methodological issues. Furthermore, the finding
that implicit processing manifests a similar asynchrony to con-
scious report (Arnold et al., 2001), argues against an explanation of
perceptual asynchrony based entirely on attentional mechanisms.
Thus, attention does not seem to be responsible for the best part of
perceptual asynchrony in vision. The idea that the latter emerges
as a direct consequence of functional specialization in the visual
system, comes out as the most attractive explanation of the asyn-
chrony phenomenon. Attention might be able to slightly alter the
magnitude of the effect in favor of one or another attribute, and
the differentiation between perceptual asynchrony being caused
by differences in processing time vs. attention seems arbitrary, as
the latter could very well influence the former. A model in which
several factors (attention included) could influence the time nec-
essary for neuronal processing, seems to be the most appropriate
explanation for the perceptual asynchrony observed. However, the
question of how different visual attributes, which are processed
independently, are perceptually bound together to form a coherent
conscious percept, remains open.
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